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Original post can be found here: https://benzweibelson.medium.com/lecture-portions-on-complexity-the-idea-of-problem-and-on-reflective-practice-in-design-9031dd44f7d6

Humans conceptualize problems in four primary modes according to complexity theorist Russell Ackoff. These consist of problem absolution, problem solution, problem resolution, and problem dissolution.

Problem absolution consists of ignoring a problem with the expectation that over time, it will fade away or otherwise not require any activity to address it. This non-action is itself an action in any complex system, and paradoxically many organizations utilize ‘problem absolution’ wittingly as well as unwittingly in that they apply their decision-making methodologies (such as the Joint Planning Process) to particular identified security issues but not to others. They also may unwittingly misidentify or fail to identify rather complex challenges or employ reductionist methods to focus on an isolated portion of a broader challenge so that a desired ‘problem’ is paired with an institutionalized solution in the same single-loop process while the vast remainder of the broader problem is ignored or unrealized through problem absolution.

Problem resolution is: “to resolve a problem is to select a course of action that yields an outcome that is good enough, one that satisfices.” Ackoff calls this the clinical approach because it relies extensively upon past experiences and a clinical construct of experimental trial and errors that build into a long-term, cohesive knowledge base where clinicians might return to for working resolutions when encountering seemingly similar problem sets. While militaries are bound to systematic logic and ‘problem solution matched with identification of related and historically consistent problem’- in practice most operators on the ground end up blending the clinical, mechanistic ‘solution’ approach with intuition, tacit knowledge and contextualization of unique circumstances so that ‘resolution’ is often the realized technique rendered. Of course, militaries routinely employ problem absolution where Ackoff defines a lack of action or intentional denial of the problem as the decided approach. This becomes ‘ignore it and hope it resolves itself’ of which there are profound examples in commerce, politics, culture and war.

Significant for those decision-makers trapped in single-loop processes, militaries gravitate toward the second type of problematization that Ackoff offers; that of problem solution. This is the only mode of problem framing that all military methodologies, doctrine and training utilize. Problem solution is “to select a course of action that is believed to yield the best possible outcome, one that optimizes.” Ackoff pairs this with a ‘research approach’ in that the problem-solution framework best matches a scientific methodology and suits the terminology, tools, and techniques of the modern military enterprise that seeks to emulate natural science communities of practice. Ackoff differentiates ‘problem solution’ with that of ‘problem resolution.’

Ackoff’s fourth form for dealing with problems is the one absent from modern military decision-making methods, and is called problem dissolution. “Dissolution involves idealization rather than satisficing or optimization (or ignoring), because its objective is to so change the system or its environment as to bring the system closer to an ultimately desirable state, one in which the problem cannot or does not arise.” This is what Ackoff terms the design approach. Problem dissolution cannot be accomplished within single-loop thinking, nor can operators consider beyond any process that locks them into non-reflectively performing the same sort of problematization over and over.

Dissolution means that one designs a way to transform the system so that in the emergent, new system what was previously seen as a problem is dissolved and no longer a major concern. Yet the new system formation itself will generate new problems as well. Ackoff explains this distinction between a dissolution of a problem and linear solution of a problem:

The designer makes use of the methods, techniques, and tools of both the clinician and the researcher, but he uses them synthetically rather than analytically. He tries to change the way the system as a whole functionswithin the larger system that contains it rather than the way its parts function within it. Dissolutions are found in the containing whole; solutions are found in the contained parts.

On single-loop thinking and knowledge curation as it exists in modern military decision-making, military organizations continue to be stuck in cycles of doing the same ‘thought-to-action’ continuum over and over without the ability to reflectively practice variation outside of that single loop. Or to paraphrase Ackoff, they default into: “doing the wrong things right… [which therefore] only make us more right at being wrong.” Single loop thinking prevents the operator from considering beyond ‘are we executing our strategy/plan correctly’ as depicted in the last illustration. Further, the organization if confronted with repeated failures using this single-loop logic can only shift to yet another single-loop line of non-reflective inquiry where the question ‘are we doing the right things’ is raised to revert any critical thinking back toward process refinement. By moving from the discussion from HOW to that of WHAT, the organization retains the same single-loop fixation on ENDS-WAYS-MEANS by creating new ends and means to consider ‘what else can we do so that the process is unquestioned yet we still can accomplish our desired goals?’

This illustration frames the overarching shift necessary for NATO and Joint Forces to transform their decision-making activities in a manner that breaks from previous efforts. Incremental changes that make minor improvements upon previous versions of doctrine is not useful, nor is replacing recently unpopular terminology with the latest ‘military buzz words’ that have captured institutional attention during the review process either.

The ‘what-how-why’ dynamic moves toward one of reflective practice by NATO and Joint Forces so that iteratively, they can design “toward failure” in that novel failure cycles a triple loop learning process of innovation, imagination, growth, and development beyond original (legacy) institutional limits.

This does not mean that failure becomes an objective; failure needs to take on a different institutional understanding for modern military forces where an indirect strategic approach is appreciated. This notion of ‘indirect strategy’ is found in the work of Robert Chia, Francois Jullien, Haridimos Tsoukas, Robin Holt, and several other organizational, complexity, and systems theorists in non-military applications. Until now, no military organization has considered applying these concepts toward decision-making in complex security applications. NATO and Joint strategists, analysts and planners could become pioneers in transforming how their military organizations approach complex warfare in a clear departure from the legacy system of yesterday’s warfighter.

With reflective practice, security designers using triple-loop thinking can reframe the ‘what’, ‘how’, and introduce ‘why’ where complex security challenges are not treated “primarily as a form of ‘problem solving’, ‘information processing’, or ‘search’…Naming, framing, moving and evaluating are central in Schön’s view of design. The designer constructs the design world within which he/she sets the dimensions of his/her problem space…the situation talks back, the practitioner listens, and as he appreciates what [he/she] hears, [he/she] reframes the situation once again.” Thus, to design in reflective practice means there is fluid transformation, and that which was formless and unimagined is not given novel form and unexpected function of emergent advantage toward the complex security challenge.

Instead of moving toward ‘what-centric’ descriptions that reinforce legacy sanctioned activities, reflective practitioners consider ‘knowing in action’ where “doing and thinking are complementary. Doing extends thinking in the tests, moves, and probes of experimental action, and reflection feeds on doing and its results. Each feeds the other, and each sets boundaries for the other.” Military professionals armed with a model of how the modern military paradigm functions as well as an understanding of reflective practice might be in a better position to challenge and disrupt the existing military institution. While this may be unpopular in times of stability and prosperity, by the time an organization is failing and in desperate need of innovation, the window of opportunity might have already sailed by.

Both NATO-OPP and JPP methodology are linear, sequential arrangements of linking conceptualization to orchestrated and managed security actions. They were designed to synchronize and produce scaled and resourced ‘concept of operations’, campaign plans, operational orders, as well as all associated analytical and staff activities to support these activities. For purposes of this design deconstruction, we will not repeat presenting the entire NATO-OPP/JPP methodologies in detail and instead focus in on the primary areas where modification, editing or complete alteration might be warranted. Ample doctrinal publications exist that articulate in exhausting detail what NATO-OPP/JPP is and how one is directed to adhere to it. Organizations even make pocket ‘smart books’ and reference guides to show how to adhere (convergently) to the planning methods; to better follow the linear casual framework. The term ‘linear’ is frequently considered derogatory to military professionals that take pride in their work as well as the methodological underpinnings that justify some scientific soundness in why they function in the forms that they take. Yet this term is indeed the first critical step in deconstructing how NATO and Joint forces approach warfare.

By ‘linear’, we are saying that when a methodology expects some clear proportionality between identified causes and expected effects, it is considered linear. Linear patterns are smooth, gradual and when mapped out show clear relationships and an ability to plot and predict their future behavior. When there is a lack of proportionality between cause and effect, it is nonlinear and is often experienced as counterintuitive or surprising. Surprise occurs because when one choses a linear methodology to describe a system (or explain reality) and that explanation is violated, there are two options. One might repeat the linear method and expect reality to produce the expected outcome in another effort, or one can determine that the methodology used is insufficient to appropriately describe the system at hand. In the former, one is doing “the definition of insanity by doing the same things over and over while expecting different results”, while in the latter one employs reflective practice to break away from institutionally biased behaviors.

We often hesitate to realize the vastness of nonlinear patterns in complex security contexts because we do not feature the technical language of complexity theory in our decision-making methodologies. Additionally, we also approach such patterns expecting confirmation of our linear-casual belief system concerning how all modern warfare ought to function; when this fails in action, we are surprised that linear expectations did not result in linear results. Nonlinear systems abound in complex reality where one does not see a smoothed or gradual path “but punctuations or avalanches… during which new forms appear.” The pattern shows no recognizable relationship from cause to effect, input to output, or beginning phenomenon to delivered ‘end result’. We rarely get to our desired end states because they never existed except in our institutionally sanctioned fantasies that we project upon a complex reality. While doctrine writers have inserted some terms from complexity theory, these are often stripped of their original meaning and instead assimilated into the ‘Newtonian Style’ warfighter frame that supposes natural science rigidity and stability into all considerations for conflict and defense.

Dynamic, complex systems never properly line up with such fantastically simplistic military expectations outside of immediate, localized and tactical events. This links to ‘ends-ways-means’ logic that also will be explained later in this student guide. Linear causal relationships of course do exist, but only in simplistic contexts and rarely can be associated with broader complexity. This temptation to standardize military decision-making into linear causal constructs extends from human enterprises in general and, according to Lampeland Mintzberg: “is rooted in the wish to simplify the world and make our frameworks as general as possible.” We seek to tame the chaos of war just enough to permit our decision-making methodology to function.

This graphic is from the 2020 version of Joint Planning doctrine published by the U.S. Department of Defense and a powerful influence on how NATO partners, allies and associated military forces curate their own military decision-making methodologies. While Joint doctrine states that “the planning process is a recursive, assessment-informed process and not linear,” this does not mean JPP is conducted in a non-linear or emergent fashion as design occurs. Instead, “not linear” suggests only that the systematic sequence of activities occurs as depicted in doctrine, and while the organization may gain new analysis or information and return to a prior step, each activity is isolated and positioned in the established order where once completed (or revisited), one moves in the same established direction forward to the next uncompleted or uninitiated step. This frames ‘linear/non-linear’ in a classical ‘Newtonian Physics’ metaphoric device instead of complexity theory where ‘non-linear’ means something entirely different. If anything, contemporary military doctrine infers ‘out of order’ instead of ‘not linear’ in terms of operational flexibility in planning activities, which again conforms the institution to a Newtonian worldview of causes and effects, inputs to outputs linking ways and means to preconceived ‘ends’.

The latest version of NATO planning doctrine published in 2021 even declares: “The process and templates presented in the COPD v3.0 are a capture of best practice; they suit well a timely and systematic movement through the process from one phase to another.” Both JPP and NATO-OPP position the commander as central to leading and shaping the entire decision-making process with staff analysis and expertise set within the centralized military hierarchical form of organizational expression. The institution again reinforces the traditional centralized hierarchy as the preferred organizational form, where the commander sits atop a clear structured entity that follows the linear-causal sequencing of activities illustrated above where one follows the recipe exactly in order to produce the desired meal. The greater the adherence to the recipe (NATO-OPP/JPP process informing the commander), the stronger the expectation that a successful outcome will be achieved by all.

Both JPP and NATO-OPP commence their decision-making process with strategic guidance, reinforcing the centralized hierarchical organization and the ‘top-down’ structure of nesting all conceptual activities within both decision-making methodologies within the Westphalian nation-state (and Clausewitzian explained) relationship of civilian-military dialogue that occurs simultaneously between senior civilian/governmental and military leaders at the national level for security affairs. The first planning function in JPP is termed ‘strategic guidance’ and groups the initial analysis of existing strategic guidance with whatever new or emergent strategic guidance might be occurring. Senior military leadership “crafts objectives that support national strategic objectives with the guidance and consent of [the U.S. Secretary of Defense]; if required, the [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] offers advice.” Strategic overarching objectives are identified first, and in a ‘reverse-engineering’ process that follows the above graphical sequence of synchronized, linear-causal activities, the military organization develops a plan or order for execution and assessment.